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CASE NOTES
for treatment, and a wrongful denial of its service could well be a sub-
stantial injury to an injured or sick person. Third, existence and knowl-
edge of the emergency room is the basis on which the community relies
on its facilities in time of emergency and for the arbitrary denial of its
services which results in injury the private hospital should not escape lia-
bility. The imposition of liability on the private hospital for its refusal to
render treatment or admission in any emergency may well be a manifes-
tation by the courts of "their vitality and consecration to the proposition
that the purpose of law in society is to aid in the solution of the multiple
problems of that society.13 4
34 Dooley, Ten Years of Developments in the Law of Negligent Torts, 10 DE PAUL
L. REv. 503, 537 (1961).
TORTS-EXTENSION OF PRENATAL INJURY DOC-
TRINE TO NONVIABLE INFANTS
Action was brought on behalf of a child born with subnormal mental
faculties who was also hampered by substandard development requiring
special medical attention. It was alleged that the defendant's negligent
operation of her automobile resulted in an accident involving the mother
of the injured child. It was further alleged that the aforementioned negli-
gence of the defendant resulted in injury to the child who was then in the
mother's womb. At the time of the incident, the child's mother was ap-
proximately one month pregnant. The trial court dismissed the action on
the basis that the child was not a viable' foetus, capable of extra-uterine
survival, at the time of the accident and therefore the infant had no iden-
tity apart from the mother. In reversing the trial court's decision, the Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois held that an infant, who was born alive and sur-
vives, can maintain an action to recover for prenatal injuries, medically
provable as resulting from the negligence of another, even if it had not
reached the state of a viable foetus at the time of the injury. Daley v.
Meier, 33 111. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961).
In allowing a cause of action for injuries sustained while a nonviable
infant, Illinois becomes one of a handful of jurisdictions which have re-
cently extended the area of recovery for prenatal injuries to any injury,
occurring prior to birth, which can be proved as resulting from the negli-
gence of another. Relief for prenatal injuries had previously been re-
1 "Viable. Not born dead. Capable of living, said of a fetus that can live outside of
the uterus." MALoY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 567 (2d ed. 1951). "Viable.
Livable, having the appearance of being able to live." BLACK, LAW DICnONARY 1737
(4th ed. 1951).
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stricted only to cases where the injury was to a viable infant. Permitting
a cause of action for prenatal injuries is in itself a comparatively new doc-
trine which has evolved in recent years, overturning what had previously
been considered a well-established principle that no recovery would be
allowed a child for prenatal injuries caused by another's negligence.
In Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,2 probably the first recorded
case wherein recovery for injuries sustained before birth was sought, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that no remedy could be
granted. Justice Holmes, in rendering the opinion, based the decision on
(1) the lack of precedent; and (2) the child's lack of an existence separate
and distinct from the mother.
Where the question of prenatal injuries arose elsewhere, the precedent
set by the Dietrich case was followed,8 and the courts set forth additional
reasons for denying recovery.4 Some of the reasons advanced were: (1)
causation was difficult to prove; 5 (2) conjecture or speculation would be
the basis of recovery; (3) allowing recovery is a matter for legislative
consideration;7 and (4) permitting a cause of action for prenatal injuries
would give rise to fictitious claims.8
Prior to 19469 the states of Alabama,10 Illinois," Massachusetts, 12 Mich-
2 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
3 E.g., Cavanaugh v. First National Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952); Bliss
v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Ryan v. Public Service Coordinated
Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (1940); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich.
60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347,
78 S.W.2d 944 (1935). In Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. (Ire.) 69 (1891), a
cause of action was not recognized for prenatal injuries, but no mention was made of
the Dietrich case.
4 For a detailed analysis of the development of the prenatal injury doctrine, see 3
DePaul L. Rev. 257 (1959).
5 Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Stanford v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
6 Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935);
Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
7 Cavanaugh v. First National Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952); Ryan v.
Public Service Coordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (1940); Newman
v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,
184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446
(1939).
8 Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
9 In 1946 a cause of action for prenatal injuries was recognized in Bonbrest v. Kotz,
65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
10 Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926) (wrong-
ful death action denied).
11 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 1M. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Smith v. Luckhardt,
299 IlL. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939) (recovery for personal injuries denied).
12 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884)
(wrongful death action not allowed).
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igan,13 Missouri, 14 New Jersey,15 New York,16 Ohio,17 Pennsylvania,' 8
Rhode Island, 19 Texas20 and Wisconsin 21 had decided upon the question
of prenatal injuries and had refused to recognize a cause of action.22
The infant's mother was awaiting the birth of the child at defendant
hospital in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital23 wherein the defendant's negli-
gence was alleged as the cause of the injury to the child. The court re-
fused to recognize a cause of action. However, a dissenting opinion by
Justice Boggs in the Allaire case was an influencing factor in subsequent
decisions which allowed recovery to a viable infant. Boggs contended:
A foetus . . . reaches that prenatal age of viability when the destruction of
the life of the mother does not necessarily end its existence also, and when,
if separated prematurely and by artificial means from the mother, it would
be so far a matured human being as that it would live and grow, mentally
and physically, as other children generally, it is but to deny a palpable fact
to argue there is but one life, and that the life of the mother.24
The argument that an unborn child lacks existence separate from the
mother and therefore can not be considered a person in being for legal
purposes has been weakened by the fact that other areas, such as criminal
13 Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937) (personal injury
action denied).
14 Buel v. United Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913) (wrongful death action
denied).
15 Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942); Ryan v. Public Service Co-
ordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (1940) (denied personal injury
action).
16 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Nugent v. Brooklyn Hts.
Ry., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913), appeal dismissed, 209 N.Y. 515, 102 N.E.
1107 (1913) (personal injury action denied).
17 Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943) (recovery for prenatal in-
juries denied).
18 Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940) (recovery for personal
prenatal injuries denied).
19 Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 At. 704 (1901) (wrongful death action
denied).
20 Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935)
(denied wrongful death action).
21 Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916)
(personal injury action denied).
22 Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (recovery allowed on basis of
Louisiana's civil law background) (case furnished by the court for publication in
1949). Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939) (California granted
relief on the basis of a state statute providing that a child conceived, not yet born,
would be considered an existing person).
23 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
24 Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.
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law and property law, have long recognized the legal existence of a
child not yet born.2 5
Law which is unchanging is like a stagnant pool. As knowledge in other
fields is expanded, courts must adopt their decisions so as to fill the gap
between outdated precedent and modern realizations. "When these ghosts
of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their mediaeval chains the
proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred. '26
In Bonbrest v. Kotz2 7 the court recognized a cause of action in a suit
alleging medical malpractice for a direct injury to a viable child, "capable
... of extra-uterine life,"' 28 where it was alleged that the defendant negli-
gently attempted to take the child from his mother's womb. The Bonbrest
case, the turning point in allowing recovery for prenatal injuries in this
country,29 has been followed by a reversal of the holdings denying recov-
ery for prenatal injuries in the states of Illinois,' 0 Missouri,8 ' New Jer-
sey,8 2 New York, 8 Ohio 34 and Pennsylvania. a5 Other jurisdictions which
previously denied recovery have either indicated a possible reversal in
the future,' 6 or, while expressly denying the need to reverse a prior hold-
25 "Although they might not be exactly parallel situations we find it difficult to see
the logic which would recognize a child's legal existence while en ventre sa mere with
respect to property rights and rights of inheritance and so also in the field of criminal
law and yet would deny it recognition so as to afford it protection against the torts of
others." Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958).
26 Lord Atkin in United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd. [1941] A.C. 1, 29.
2765 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
28 Id. at 140.
29 In Montreal Tramways v. Levcille [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada allowed recovery for a child born with club feet, but the decision was influenced
by Canada's civil law background.
80 Amann v. Faidy, 415 111. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 I11. 496,
114 N.E.2d 721 (1953), reversing Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638
(1900).
"1.Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953), reversing Buel v. United
Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913).
82 Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (recovery allowed without an
allegation that the child was viable), reversing Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d
489 (1942).
"3Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951) [noted: 2 DePaul L. Rev.
97 (1952)], reversing Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
a4 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949), revers-
ing Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943).
'5Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (infant nonviable at the time
of injury), reversing Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
86 LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto
Ins., 8 Wis.2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
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ing, allowed recovery in view of modern precedent. 37 A cause of action
has also been recognized for prenatal injuries to a viable infant in the
states of Connecticut,38 Delaware,39 Georgia, 40 Iowa,41 Kentucky,
42
Maryland, 43 Minnesota, 44 Mississippi, 45 New Hampshire, 46 Oregon 47 and
South Carolina.48 Recovery has usually been allowed only where the
child has been born alive. 49
No longer is the precedent lacking for recognizing the legal existence
of a child in allowing recovery for injuries sustained prior to birth.50
Courts, in recognizing a cause of action, have been swayed by the injus-
tice which had evolved through the denial of recovery where a wrong
had been committed. They have not only rejected the false theory that a
cause of action should not exist because of the difficulty of proving a
causal relation between the injury and the wrongful act, but they have
also disclaimed any merit in the contention that there may be the possi-
bility of fictitious claims. The law should neither deny relief where a
wrong has been done nor block an attempt to prove the causal relation-
ship, particularly in light of modern medical science, merely because the
causal connection may be difficult to prove. If the plaintiff is not able to
prove his case, he will not prevail. 51 The evidence must meet the usual
tests required in tort cases.52
37 Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
38 Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955). Also
see Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955).
39 Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956).
4 0 Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951).
41 Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960).
42 Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
43 Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
44 Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
45 Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954).
46Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
47 Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
48 Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
49 Contra, Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Poliquin v. MacDonald,
101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App.
1955); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229
Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (recovery under wrongful death statutes allowed
where child was born dead except in Wendt v. Lillo where a cause of action was
allowed under a survival statute).
50 "If inability 'to find any precedent at common law' were a good reason to deny an
injured person a remedy, then, indeed, the common law would never have reached the
embryo stage." Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1230, 258 S.W.2d 577, 579 (1953).
51 Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
521Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
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Recent cases have allowed recovery where there was injury to a child
which had at least reached the stage of viability. Although the child is not
strictly separate from the mother, neither is it strictly a part of the mother
in that while the child depends for its development upon sustenance from
the mother, it is not considered a "part" of the mother "in the sense of a
constituent element."5
Liability for injury to a nonviable infant was first recognized as a fur-
ther extension of the doctrine of allowing recovery for prenatal injuries
in Kelly v. Gregory,54 and subsequently five jurisdictions which have
considered the question have also allowed recovery to a nonviable in-
fant.55
The infant in the Kelly case was allegedly injured by the defendant's
negligent operation of an automobile while the child's mother was in the
third month of pregnancy. The court, in recognizing a cause of action,
emphasized that legal separability should begin where there is biological
separability, which latter separability begins at conception. The biologi-
cal contribution of the mother, beginning with conception, is to nourish
and protect. The foetus has already become a separate organism. This
characteristic of being separate will not be destroyed, even though the
child may not live if deprived of protection and nourishment prior to
reaching the viable stage of its development. 56
The particular moment after conception, or the particular period of
prenatal existence of the child, when the injury was inflicted has been
held to be not controlling.57 Courts have deemed it an injustice to deny
a child born alive a right of recovery for injuries which he might bear
for the remainder of his life because of the tortious conduct of another-
regardless of viability or nonviability. 58
There was no allegation as to whether the child, born subsequent to the
alleged wrongful act with deformities of legs and feet, was viable or non-
viable at the time of the injury in Smith v. Brennan.59 A distinction be-
tween whether the child was viable or nonviable at the time of the injury
was not required. The court assented to a cause of action without such
53 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Stpp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).
54 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
55 Daley v.Meier, 33 111. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa.
267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Bennett
v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.,
212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
50 Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
57 Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
58 Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
59 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
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distinction. It has been recognized by medical authorities that a child is
not merely a part of its mother's body but rather is in existence from the
moment of conception.60
It should be immaterial whether an unborn child is considered a person
at the time of the injury before recovery will be allowed. A person will
be produced if the biological processes set in motion by conception are
left undisturbed. Where injuries caused by disruption of biological proc-
esses became apparent after birth, it is immaterial whether the infant is
deemed a person prior to birth. Justice requires that a child have a legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body. If ,there is interference
with that right by the wrongful conduct of another, and competent proof
can establish the causal connection between the wrongful interference
and the harm suffered by the child, the infant should recover damages for
such harm.61
The exact point of time at which the child becomes viable is practically
impossible to determine in a border-line case unless the child is born im-
mediately after the injury, so it would seem that the "viability theory"
would therefore lack practical application as a test of liability. Serious
doubt is therefore raised as to whether the age of the infant at the time of
the wrongful act should ever be given controlling consideration in allow-
ing recovery. This doubt is evident from the following words of the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey:
Whether viable or not at the time of the injury, the child sustains the same
harm after birth, and therefore should be given the same opportunity for
redress.62
Recent decisions have, almost without exception, allowed a cause of
action for prenatal injuries, notwithstanding the fact that the child had
not yet attained the stage of viability at the time of the injury.63 Some
courts have expressly withheld an opinion regarding nonviable infants
while allowing a cause of action to exist where the child was clearly
viable.6 4
If it can be proven that the wrongful conduct of another was the cause
of an injury to an unborn child later born alive, recovery should be al-
lowed. To deny a cause of action would result in a remediless wrong. The
60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Id. at 367, 157 A.2d at 504.
63 Daley v. Meier, 33 111. App.2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401
Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Bennett
v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.,
212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696
(1953).
6 4 Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); Rainey v. Horn, 221 M;-s. 269,
72 So.2d 434 (1954).
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extension of the doctrine of recovery for prenatal injuries to nonviable
infants has gained notable support in the past few years, and is an indi-
cation that courts may now overlook the frequently utilized "viability
theory" in favor of the newer "conception theory." The "conception
theory" as set forth in the instant case has risen in popularity in a rela-
tively short period of time. This novel doctrine should see adoption in
more jurisdictions in the future. Such a selection would be in the interest
of justice.
TORTS-IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
CORPORATION AND DUE PROCESS-A NEW FRONTIER
Gray, an Illinois resident, brought an action against American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corporation and the Titan Valve Manufacturing
Company for injuries suffered when a water heater allegedly exploded.
The complaint charged, inter alia, that plaintiff's injuries were proximate-
ly caused by the negligent manufacture of the safety valve by the Titan
Company, a foreign corporation. Titan manufactured the valve in Ohio
and sold it outside of Illinois to American Radiator, who incorporated it
into the water heater in Pennsylvania and sold heater and valve to plain-
tiff through a distributor in Illinois. Jurisdiction was predicated upon
section 17(1) (b) of the Civil Practice Act' with summons personally
served upon Titan's registered agent in Ohio, as provided for in the Act.2
Titan appeared specially and moved to quash the service, contending
that it had committed no "tortious act" in Illinois, in that it did no busi-
ness in Illinois, had no agent physically present in Illinois, and that it sold
the valve to defendant American Radiator outside of Illinois. The circuit
court of Cook County granted Titan's motion and dismissed the com-
plaint.
Plaintiff appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court because a con-
stitutional question was involved.8 The Court held that defendant Titan
I ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 17(1) (1961). Section 17(1) provides: "Any person,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent
does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State
as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts: ...
"(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;"
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 16 (1961). Section 16 provides that personal service of
summons outside of the state, upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the state, shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons
within the state.
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 75(1) (a) (1961).
